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Abstract—Information-theoretic work for wiretap channels is
mostly based on random coding schemes. Designing practical
coding schemes to achieve information-theoretic security is an
important problem. By applying the two recently developed
techniques for polar codes, we propose a polar coding scheme to
achieve the secrecy capacity of the general wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel was first introduced by Wyner [1], in
which a legitimate transmitter (Alice) wishes to send messages
to a legitimate receiver (Bob) secretly in the presence of
an eavesdropper (Eve). Wyner [1] characterized the capacity
equivocation region for the degraded wiretap channel, in
which the received signal at Eve is a degraded version of
the received signal at Bob. Later, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2]
characterized the capacity equivocation region for general, not
necessarily degraded, wiretap channels. These works are based
on information-theoretic random coding schemes.
Polar coding, invented by Arıkan [3], is the first code that
provably achieves the capacity of the binary-input discrete
symmetric output channels (B-DMC). The idea of polar coding
has been extended to lossless source coding [4], lossy source
coding [5], and to multi-user scenarios, such as, multiple ac-
cess channel [6]–[8], broadcast channel [9], [10], interference
channel [11], and Slepian-Wolf coding problem [12].
On a B-DMC, polarization results in two kinds of sub-
channels [3]. The first kind is good sub-channels. The capacity
for these sub-channels approaches 1 bit per channel use. The
second kind is bad sub-channels. The channel output for these
sub-channels is independent of the channel input; therefore the
capacity for these sub-channels approaches 0. In particular, if
a B-DMC A is degraded with respect to a B-DMC B, then
the good sub-channels of A must be a subset of the good
sub-channels of B [13]. We call this the subset property.
Polar coding schemes for degraded wiretap channels with
symmetric main and eavesdropper channels are developed
using the subset property in [14]–[17]. For degraded wiretap
channels, the good sub-channels of Eve is a subset of the good
sub-channels of Bob. The polar coding scheme is designed
to transmit the confusion messages (random bits) on the sub-
channels simultaneously good for Bob and Eve, and to transmit
the secret messages on the sub-channels only good for Bob.
However, for non-degraded wiretap channels, the subset prop-
erty no longer holds [18]–[22], i.e., the good sub-channels of
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Eve is not necessary a subset of the good sub-channels of Bob.
Moreover, the secrecy capacity achieving input distribution is
not necessarily a uniform distribution. Therefore, the polar
coding schemes in [14]–[17] cannot directly extend to the non-
degraded wiretap channel.
By applying the two recently developed techniques for
polar codes, we can achieve the secrecy capacity of the
general wiretap channel. The first is universal polar codes
[21], [22]. Universal polar coding allows us to align the good
sub-channels of Bob and Eve together. Therefore, we can
artificially construct the subset property for the non-degraded
wiretap channel. Then, Alice transmits the random bits on the
sub-channels simultaneously good for Bob and Eve, and the
secret message on the sub-channels only good for Bob. The
second is polar coding for asymmetric models [23], which
allows us to deal with the non-uniform input distribution.
Different from B-DMC, polarization for asymmetric channel
results in three different kinds of sub-channels.
Another polar coding scheme for the general wiretap chan-
nel is provided in [24], which uses a concatenated code
consisting of two polar codes. The inner layer ensures that the
transmitted message can be reliably decoded by Bob, and the
outer layer guarantees that the message is kept secret from Eve.
Our work jointly handles these two goals in one shot. Hence,
the decoding error probability of our scheme is approximately
O(2−n
1/2
), whereas it is O(
√
n2−n
1/4
) in [24]. Moreover, for
practical code construction, there is still no efficient way to
characterize the outer index set [24, Sec III. C.], while our
coding scheme can be efficiently constructed by [19].
II. WIRETAP CHANNEL MODEL
A wiretap channel consists of a legitimate transmitter (Al-
ice) who wishes to send messages to a legitimate receiver
(Bob) secretly in the presence of an the eavesdropper (Eve).
The channel between Alice and Bob is called the main
channel, and the channel between Alice and Eve is called
the eavesdropper channel. Let X denote the single-letter
input to the main and eavesdropper channels. Let Y and Z
denote the corresponding single-letter outputs of the main
and the eavesdropper channels, respectively. W represents the
message to be sent to Bob and kept secret from Eve with
W ∈ W = {1, · · · , 2nR}. Let Pe = Pr(Wˆ 6= W) denote the
probability of error for Bob’s decoding.
The equivocation rate is given by 1
n
H(W |Zn), which
reflects the uncertainty of the message given eavesdropper’s
channel observation. A rate-equivocation pair (R,Re) is
achievable if as n→∞, Pe → 0 and limn→∞ 1nH(W |Zn) ≥
Re. Perfect (weak) secrecy is achieved if R = Re [2].
Therefore, perfect secrecy is achieved if 1
n
I(W ;Zn) → 0,
and the secrecy capacity Cs is the highest achievable perfect
secrecy rate R, which is also the highest possible equivocation
rate [2]. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner characterized the secrecy capacity
for the general wiretap channel, which is [2]
Cs = max
V→X→Y,Z
I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z). (1)
In the following, we assume that we already know the
optimal input distribution [25], i.e., we know the optimal V ,
X that achieve Cs. Although we focus on developing a coding
scheme for binary inputs below, there is no difficulty to extend
the work to q-ary inputs [26]–[29].
III. POLAR CODES
A. Polar Codes for Asymmetric Channels
Let PTV be the joint distribution of a pair of random
variables (T, V ), where T is a binary random variable and
V is any finite alphabet random variable. Let us define the
Bhattacharyya parameter as follows
Z(T |V ) = 2
∑
v
PV (v)
√
PT |V (0|v)PT |V (1|v). (2)
Let Un = XnGn, where Xn denotes n independent copies
of the random variable X with X ∼ PX , and Gn = G⊗k
where G =
[
1 0
1 1
]
and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product of
matrices for n = 2k. [4] shows as n → ∞, Ui is almost
independent of U i−1 and uniformly distributed, or otherwise
Ui is almost determined by U i−1. Therefore, [n], the index set
{1, 2, . . . , n}, is almost polarized into two sets HX and LX :
HX = {i ∈ [n] : Z(Ui|U i−1) ≥ 1− δn}
LX = {i ∈ [n] : Z(Ui|U i−1) ≤ δn}, (3)
where δn = 2−n
β
and β ∈ (0, 1/2). Moreover,
lim
n→∞
1
n
|HX | = H(X)
lim
n→∞
1
n
|LX | = 1−H(X). (4)
Let P be a discrete memoryless channel with a binary
input X and finite alphabet output Y . Here, P does not have
to be a symmetric channel. Fix a distribution PX for X .
[23] generalizes the above argument to achieve a rate close
to I(X ;Y ). Consider two subsets of [n], HX|Y and LX|Y ,
defined as follows
HX|Y = {i ∈ [n] : Z(Ui|U i−1, Y n) ≥ 1− δn}
LX|Y = {i ∈ [n] : Z(Ui|U i−1, Y n) ≤ δn}, (5)
similar to (4), we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
|HX|Y | = H(X |Y )
lim
n→∞
1
n
|LX|Y | = 1−H(X |Y ). (6)
With (3) and (5), we define the following three sets
I = HX ∩ LX|Y (7)
Fr = HX ∩ LcX|Y (8)
Fd = HcX . (9)
In the following, we call the set I the information set, and sets
Fr and Fd the frozen set. Although we call them the frozen set,
Fr and Fd have different operational meanings which will be
illustrated below. Note that for the symmetric channel capacity
achieving code design, Fd is an empty set [3].
To achieve rate I(X ;Y ) for channel P , let us consider
the following coding scheme. First, the encoder transmits the
information bits in the index set I. For i ∈ I in (7), since
i ∈ HX , Ui is almost independent of U i−1 and uniformly
distributed. Therefore, the encoder can freely assign values to
UI , where UI denotes a sub-vector {Ui}i∈I . Moreover, since
i ∈ LX|Y , Ui is almost determined by U i−1 and Y n, which
means that given the channel output Y n, Ui is decoded in a
successive manner.
Second, for i ∈ Fr in (8), Ui is almost independent of U i−1
and uniformly distributed, and given the channel output Y n, Ui
cannot be reliably decoded. The encoder transmits UFr with
a uniformly random sequence and the randomness is shared
between the transmitter and the receiver.
Last, for i ∈ Fd in (9), Ui is almost determined by U i−1.
The values of UFd are computed in successive order through
the following randomized map
ui = arg max
u∈{0,1}
PUi|Ui−1(u|ui−1). (10)
By (4) and (6), it is easy to verify that
lim
n→∞
1
n
|I| = I(X ;Y ). (11)
Moreover, by applying successive cancellation decoder, the
block error probability Pe can be upper bounded by
Pe ≤
∑
i∈I
Z(Ui|U i−1, Y n) = O(2−nβ ) (12)
for any β ∈ (0, 1/2), with complexity O(n logn). Therefore,
the rate I(X ;Y ) is achieved.
B. Universal Polar Coding
Consider two B-DMCs P : X → Y and Q : X → Z , and
assume that these two channels have identical capacities, i.e.,
C(P ) = C(Q). Let Un = XnGn, and denote P and Q as the
information set defined in (7), i.e.,
P = {i ∈ [n] : Z(Ui|U i−1, Y n) ≤ δn}
Q = {i ∈ [n] : Z(Ui|U i−1, Zn) ≤ δn},
where δn = 2−n
β
and β ∈ (0, 1/2). Since we assume C(P ) =
C(Q), we also have |P| = |Q|.
In general, the differences P \Q and Q \P are not empty
sets [18]–[20]; therefore, it is not straightforward to apply
standard polar coding to achieve the capacity of the compound
channel consisting of P and Q. [21] proposes a method, called
chaining construction, to solve this problem.
Definition 1 (Chaining construction [21]) Let m ≥ 2. The
m-chain of P and Q is a code of length mn that consists
of m polar blocks of length n. In each of the m blocks, the
set P ∩ Q is set to be an information set. In the ith block,
1 ≤ i < m, the set P \ Q is also set to be an information
set. Moreover, the set P \ Q in the ith block is chained to
the set Q \ P in the (i + 1)th block in the sense that the
information is repeated in these two sets. All other indices are
frozen. Therefore, in each block, the set (P ∪ Q)c is frozen,
and the set Q\P in the 1st block and the set P \Q in the mth
block are frozen, too. Note that (·)c denotes the complement
of a set. The rate of the chaining construction is
|P ∩ Q|+ m−1
m
|P \ Q|
n
. (13)
Next, we discuss the decoding procedure for the compound
channel consisting of P and Q. If the channel P is used,
then we decode from the first block. On the other hand, if the
channel Q is used, then we decode from the last block.
First, suppose that channel P is used and a code of length
mn has been received. For this case, we decode from the first
block. In the 1st block, we put all the information bits in the set
P , thus the decoder can decode correctly. For the 2nd block,
through chaining construction, the set P\Q in the 1st block is
chained to the set Q\P in the 2nd block, and the set (P∪Q)c
is frozen. Equivalently, the decoder only needs to decode the
bits in the set P , which can be correctly decoded. The same
procedure holds until the (m− 1)th block. For the mth block,
the information bits are only put in the set P ∩ Q, and the
remaining part has been determined. Hence, information bits
can be reliably decoded. The main rate loss for the chaining
construction comes from the last block.
Second, consider the case that the channel Q is used. In this
case, we decode from the last block. In the mth block, since
the information bits are put in the set Q, reliable decoding
is guaranteed. For the (m − 1)th block, due to the chaining
process, the set Q \ P in the mth block is chained to the set
P \Q in the (m−1)th block, and note that the set (P∪Q)c is
frozen. The decoder only needs to decode the information bits
in the set Q, thus correct decoding is ensured. This procedure
is applied until the 2nd block. For the 1st block, information
bits which have not been determined fall in the set P ∩ Q,
thus the decoder can decode them correctly.
In summary, for a fixed m, if we let n→∞, we can achieve
the rate in (13) with arbitrary small error probability, which
also means that the rate C(P ) − 1
m
|P\Q|
n
can be achieved.
Additionally, if we let m→∞, then the rate C(P ), which is
the capacity of the compound channel consisting of channels
P and Q, can be achieved.
IV. POLAR CODING FOR THE GENERAL WIRETAP CHANNEL
Assume now that we know the optimal distributions to
achieve the secrecy capacity Cs in (1), i.e., we know the
optimal V and X . For illustration, we consider the case of
a binary input channel, i.e., |X | = 2. The cardinality bound
for channel prefixing V , is |V| ≤ 2.
A. The Scheme
Let Un = V nGn. Consider the following sets:
HV = {i ∈ [n] : Z(Ui|U i−1) ≥ 1− δn}
LV = {i ∈ [n] : Z(Ui|U i−1) ≤ δn}, (14)
HV |Y = {i ∈ [n] : Z(Ui|U i−1, Y n) ≥ 1− δn}
LV |Y = {i ∈ [n] : Z(Ui|U i−1, Y n) ≤ δn}, (15)
HV |Z = {i ∈ [n] : Z(Ui|U i−1, Zn) ≥ 1− δn}
LV |Z = {i ∈ [n] : Z(Ui|U i−1, Zn) ≤ δn}, (16)
where δn = 2−n
β
and β ∈ (0, 1/2).
The set [n] can be partitioned into the following four sets:
GY ∧Z = HV ∩ LV |Y ∩ LV |Z , (17)
GY \Z = HV ∩ LV |Y ∩ LcV |Z , (18)
GZ\Y = HV ∩ LcV |Y ∩ LV |Z , (19)
BY ∧Z = HcV ∪ (LcV |Y ∩ LcV |Z). (20)
From a successive decoding point of view, the sub-channels
corresponding to the set GY ∧Z are simultaneously good for
Bob and Eve. The sub-channels in the set GY \Z are good for
Bob but bad for Eve. On the other hand, the sub-channels in
the set GZ\Y are good for Eve but bad for Bob. Last, the
sub-channels in the set BY ∧Z are bad for both Bob and Eve.
Similar to (7)–(9), we have:
IY = HV ∩ LV |Y ,
IZ = HV ∩ LV |Z ,
FYr = HV ∩ LcV |Y ,
FZr = HV ∩ LcV |Z ,
Fd = HcV . (21)
By (11), we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
|IY | = I(V ;Y ),
lim
n→∞
1
n
|IZ | = I(V ;Z). (22)
For the symmetric and degraded wiretap channel [14]–[17],
GZ\Y is an empty set, since the degraded property of the
channel causes IZ ⊂ IY [13]. However, for the general
wiretap channel, GZ\Y is no longer an empty set, and |GZ\Y |
cannot be negligible [18]–[20].
Here, we consider the positive secrecy capacity case, thus
we have |GY \Z | > |GZ\Y |. Choose a set, CY \Z , such that
CY \Z ⊂ GY \Z and |CY \Z | = |GZ\Y |. Define the set S as:
S = GY \Z \ CY \Z .
From (22), we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
|S| = I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z). (23)
GY ∧Z S CY \Z1st block
2nd block
(m− 1)th
· · ·
mth block
GZ\Y BY ∧Z
GY ∧Z S CY \Z GZ\Y BY ∧Z
GY ∧Z S CY \Z GZ\Y BY ∧Z
GY ∧Z S CY \Z GZ\Y BY ∧Z
Fig. 1. Chaining construction.
We construct the code as follows. Consider an m-chain polar
code in Definition 1. For 1 ≤ i < m, the set CY \Z in the ith
block is chained to GZ\Y in the (i+ 1)th block as in Fig. 1.
For each of the m blocks, the set BY ∧Z is set to be frozen.
Moreover, the set GZ\Y in the 1st block is set to be frozen
in the sense that GZ\Y ⊆ FYr , and the set CY \Z in the mth
block is also set to be frozen in the sense that CY \Z ⊆ FZr .
In Fig. 1, we use a red cross to denote a frozen set.
We put the secret information bits in the set S in each block.
Therefore, the set S is used for secret message transmission.
For blocks 1 ≤ i < m, we put uniformly distributed random
bits to CY \Z to serve as the confusion messages. Through
the chaining construction, the confusion messages are also
chained to the set GZ\Y in block 1 < i ≤ m. Moreover,
the set GY ∧Z in each block are also filled with random bits
to serve as confusion message. For the frozen sets, if the
index belongs to FYr or FZr , then we put uniformly distributed
random bits and share the randomness with the decoder (Bob
and Eve). Last, if the index belongs to Fd, then we determine
the value according to the randomized map defined in (10).
We summarize the encoding procedure as follows.
Encoding procedure:
For each block, the secret information bits are put in US , and
determine the bits in UFd by (10).
For the 1st block,
1) Put uniformly distributed random bits to UGY∧Z∪CY \Z .
2) Put uniformly distributed random bits to UFYr , and share
the randomness with the decoder.
For the jth block, 2 ≤ j < m,
1) Put uniformly distributed random bits to UGY∧Z∪CY \Z .
2) Chaining construction: repeat the bits in CY \Z of the
(j − 1)th block to the bits in UGZ\Y .
3) Put uniformly distributed random bits to UFYr ∩FZr , and
share the randomness with the decoder.
For the mth block,
1) Put uniformly distributed random bits to UGY∧Z .
2) Chaining construction: repeat the bits in CY \Z of the
(m− 1)th block to the bits in UGZ\Y .
3) Put uniformly distributed random bits to UFZr , and share
the randomness with the decoder.
Note that in the chaining construction we require the bits
in UGZ\Y equal the bits in UCY \Z . Since we fill uniformly
distributed random bits to UCY \Z , we simultaneously fill
random bits to UGZ\Y . Due to the fact that GZ\Y ∩ Fd = ∅,
we can freely choose bits in this set.
Decoding procedure:
Bob decodes from the 1st block. In each block, if i ∈ Fd, then
uˆi = argmaxu∈{0,1} PUi|Ui−1(u|uˆi−1). For the 1st block,
uˆi =


ui
if i ∈ FYr ,
argmaxu∈{0,1} PUi|Ui−1,Y n(u|uˆi−1, yn)
if i ∈ GY ∧Z ∪ CY \Z ∪ S.
For the jth block, 2 ≤ j < m,
uˆi =


ui
if i ∈ FYr ∩ FZr ,
argmaxu∈{0,1} PUi|Ui−1,Y n(u|uˆi−1, yn)
if i ∈ GY ∧Z ∪ CY \Z ∪ S,
uˆi′ in the (j − 1)th block, where i′ ∈ CY \Z
if i ∈ GZ\Y .
For the mth block,
uˆi =


ui
if i ∈ FZr ,
argmaxu∈{0,1} PUi|Ui−1,Y n(u|uˆi−1, yn)
if i ∈ GY ∧Z ∪ S,
uˆi′ in the (m− 1)th block, where i′ ∈ CY \Z
if i ∈ GZ\Y .
B. Reliability
From (23), we know as n → ∞, our coding scheme can
achieve the secrecy rate in (1). Moreover, when Bob applies
the decoding procedure described in Sec. IV-A, according to
(12), the block error probability of the whole m-chain block
can be upper bounded by
Pe ≤(m− 1)
∑
i∈CY \Z
Z(Ui|U i−1, Y n)
+m
∑
i∈GY∧Z∪S
Z(Ui|U i−1, Y n) = O(2−nβ )
for any β ∈ (0, 1/2) with complexity O(n log n). Therefore,
the secrecy rate in (1) can be achieved reliably.
C. Equivocation Calculation
We first introduce necessary notation for the calculation of
the equivocation rate. In the encoding process, we consider m
blocks each with block length n. Let Zmn denote what Eve
receives. For each block, we perform Un = V nGn, therefore,
for the total of m blocks, we have V mn and Umn.
Let Ws denote the secret message, and W˜s denote the
confusion message. Let the subscript i of a set denote the
set in the ith block. For example, Si denotes the set S in
the ith block, and GY ∧Zj denotes the set GY ∧Z in the jth
block. Since secret message is put in Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we
have Ws = ∪1≤i≤mUSi . Also, the confusion message is put
in GY ∧Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m and CY \Zj , 1 ≤ j < m. Therefore,
we have W˜s = ∪1≤i≤m,1≤j<mUGY ∧ZiUCY \Zj .
We can calculate the equivocation rate as follows:
H(Ws|Zmn)
= H(Ws, W˜s|Zmn)−H(W˜s|Ws, Zmn) (24)
= H(Ws, W˜s)− I(Ws, W˜s;Zmn)−H(W˜s|Ws, Zmn)
(25)
≥ H(Ws, W˜s)− I(V mn;Zmn)−H(W˜s|Ws, Zmn) (26)
= H(Ws) +H(W˜s)− I(V mn;Zmn)−H(W˜s|Ws, Zmn)
(27)
which is equivalent to
1
mn
I(Ws;Z
mn) ≤ 1
mn
I(V mn;Zmn)+
1
mn
H(W˜s|Ws, Zmn)− 1
mn
H(W˜s).
(28)
Here, (24) is due to chain rule of conditional entropy, (25) is
due to the definition of mutual information, (26) comes from
the data processing inequality, (27) is due to the independence
of the secret message and the confusion message. In (28), we
bound each terms on the right hand side as follows:
For the first term, we have I(V mn;Zmn) ≤∑mn
1
I(Vi;Zi)
≤ mnI(V ;Z). Therefore, 1
mn
I(V mn;Zmn) ≤ I(V ;Z).
To bound the second term, suppose Eve obtains Ws and
Zmn, and wants to decode W˜s. By symmetry of chaining
construction, Eve can apply similar decoding rule as described
in Sec. IV-A. However, this time Eve decodes from the mth
block, then the block error probability of the whole m-chain
block can be upper bounded by
Pe ≤(m− 1)
∑
i∈GZ\Y
Z(Ui|U i−1, Y n)
+m
∑
i∈GY ∧Z
Z(Ui|U i−1, Y n) = O(2−nβ )
for β ∈ (0, 1/2). Hence, by applying Fano’s inequality, we
have
H(W˜s|Ws, Zmn) ≤ H(Pe) + Pe log |W˜s|
< H(Pe) + Pe[mnI(V ;Z)].
Therefore, as n→∞, 1
mn
H(W˜s|Ws, Zmn)→ 0.
For the last term, as n → ∞, by (13) and (22), we have
(m − 1)nI(V ;Z) < H(W˜s) < mnI(V ;Z). Hence, as m →
∞, 1
mn
H(W˜s)→ I(V ;Z).
After we bound the right hand side of (28), we know as
n → ∞ and m → ∞, 1
mn
I(Ws;Z
mn) → 0. Therefore, the
weak secrecy constraint is achieved.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed a polar coding scheme that achieves the
secrecy capacity of the general wiretap channel, by using
the chaining construction technique and polar coding for
asymmetric channels. Compared to previous work, our con-
struction has better decoding error probability and can be
constructed more efficiently. Finally, we note that this chaining
construction based polar coding scheme can be extended to
achieve strong secrecy guarantees as presented in [30].
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